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NOTE
THE LAW AND TI-E UNBORN uHILD: THE LEGAL AND LOGICAL INCONSISTENCIES

I.

Introduction

Within the past few years, the abortion controversy has generated a vast
amount of literature,: litigation, 2 and legislation.8 In each case there has been
much discussion about the morality of abortion as opposed to the alleged right
of a woman to have an abortion if she so desires. To date, several abortion
statutes have been declared unconstitutional, and sixteen states have revised their
laws to permit abortion.5 The result of these actions has been further confusion in
an already inconsistent area of the law - the law with respect to the unborn child.
Several'years ago, Professor Prosser made a rather dogmatic statement concerning the legal status of the unborn child:
[Medical authority has recognized long since that the child is in existence
from the moment of conception, and for many purposes its existence is recognized by the law. The criminal law regards it as a separate entity, and the
I Some of the more recent writings on abortion are, L. LAOER, ABORTION (1966); THE
MORALITY OF ABORTION (J. Noonan ed. 1970) ; Symposium: Abortion and the Law, 17 W. REn.
L. REV. 369 (1965), reprinted in ABORTION AND THE LAW (Smith. ed. 1967); Symposium:
Abortion Law Reform, 14 CATH. LAw. 180 (1968); Symposium: Law, Morality, and Abortion, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 415 (1968); Byrn, A CriticalLook at Legalized Abortion, 41 L. A.
BAR BULL. 320 (1966); Byrn, Abortion on Demand: Whose Morality? 46 NoTRE DAME
LAWYER 5 (1970); Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DUQUESNE L. REv. 125 (1966); GrANNELLA, The Difficult Quest for a Truly Humane Abortion Law, 13 VILL. L. REv. 257
'(1968); Hughes, England's Great Leap Backward The Abortion Act, 1967 43 AusT.
L. J. 12 (1969); Kindregan, Abortion, The Law, and Defective Children: A Legal-Medical
Study, 3 SUFF. L. REv. 225 (1969); Kutner, Due Process of Abortion, 53 MINN. L. Rav.
1 (1968); Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 233 (1969); Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the
Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y. L. F. 411
(1968); Noonan, Amendment of the Abortion Law: Relevant Data and Judicial Opinion,
15 OATH. LAW. 124 (1969); Noonan, The Constitutionality of the Regulation of Abortion,
21 HAST. L. J. 51 (1969); Stern, Abortion: Reform and the Law, 59 J.'Cwiu,
L.C. & P.S.
84 (1968); Williams, Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. CoLo. L. REv. 178 (1966); Ziff,
,Recent Abortion Law Reforms (Or Much Ado About Nothing), 60 1. Canm. L.C. & P.S. 3

(1969).

2 Abortion statutes have been declared unconstitutional to some degree or another in
California, the District of Columbia, and Wisconsin. People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458
P.2d 194 (1969) (vagueness); United States v. Vuitch. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969)
(vagueness); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 197.0) (constitutional right to
abort an unquickened fetus).
3 Abortion statutes have recently been revised in some sixteen states. Alaska: ALASxA
LAWS 1970 ch. 103; Arkansas: A iu. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-301 to 310 (1969); California:
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-54 (West 1969); Colorado: CoLo. REv. STAT. ch.
40, §§ 2-50, 51 (Cum. Supp. 1969); Delaware: DEL. LAWS 1969, vol. 57, ch. 145; Georgia:
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1201 to 1203, 26-99 2 0a, 21a, 25a (1969 Revision); Hawaii: House
Bill No. 61 (1970); Kansas: KANSAS LAWS 1969 ch. 180, sec. 21-3407; Maryland: MD.
CODE ANN. art. 43, § 149E (Supp. 1969); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-5-1 to
5-3 (Supp. 1969); New York: NEW YORE: LAWS 1970 ch. 127; North Carolina: N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 14-45.1 (1969 Replacement Volume); Oregon: OREGON LAWS 1969 cb. 684,
§ 17; South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-87 (1970); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 18.162.1 Supp. 1969); Washington: WASHINGTON LAWS 1970 ch. 3, second extraofdinb-y session
(approved by Nov., 1970 referendum).
4 See note 2 supra.
5 See note 3 supra.
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law of property considers it in being for all purposes which are to its benefit,
such as taking by will or descent. .

.

. All writers who have discussed the

problem have joined... in maintaining that the unborn child in the path of
an automobile is as much a person in the street as the mother .... 6
Since that statement was made, what was once almost universal agreement as to
the legal rights of the unborn child has become confusion, primarily due to the
recent successful attacks on criminal abortion statutes. It seems that the law has
put itself in the anomalous position of protecting the legal rights of one who is
considered to have no legal right to live. Indeed, the justification of an abortion
under the Model Penal Code proposal involves no judicial process and no representation of the public interest, the interest of the father, or the interest of the
unborn child.' Furthermore, eight states have gone beyond the Code proposal
and have provided no cut-off point at all in their recent abortion statutes.8 In
these states, the unborn child can be the subject of abortion at any moment of
gestation. Can this position possibly be reconciled with the many rights that the
unborn child enjoys in the other areas of the law?
It must be noted that in attempting to define the legal status of the unborn
child, one is immediately confronted with semantic problems. Perhaps the use
of the phrase "unborn child" is somewhat imprecise and even indicative of preconceived conclusions. But the use of terms like "embryo" 9 or "fetus," 119 which
may be medically precise, is grammatically awkward since they refer only to
specific stages of gestation; and such words as "quick"" or "viable"' 2 are equally
6 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOI OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 355 (3d ed. 1964).
7 The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code § 230.3 (2)and(3) '(Proposed Official
Draft, 1962), provides:
,(2) Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is justified in terminating a
pregnancy if he believes there is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy
would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother or that the child
would be born with grave physical or mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted
from rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse. All illicit intercourse with a girl
below the age of 16 shall be deemed felonious for purposes of this subsection. Justifiable abortions shall be performed only in a licensed hospital except in case of
emergency when hospital facilities are unavailable. [Additional exceptions from the
requirement of hospitalization may be incorporated here to take account of situations in sparsely settled areas where hospitals are not generally accessible.]
(3) Physicians' Certificates; Presumption from Non-Compliance. No abortion
shall be performed unless two physicians, one of whom may be the person performing the abortion, shall have certified in writing the circumstances which they believe
to justify the abortion. Such certificate shall be submitted before the abortion to the
hospital where it is to be performed and, in the case of abortion following felonious
intercourse, to the prosecuting attorney or the police. Failure to comply with any
of the requirements of this Subsection gives rise to a presumption that the abortion
was unjustified.
8- Arkansas, Colorado (except in case of rape or incest), Georgia, Kansas, New Mexico,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. See statutes cited in note 3, supra.
9 Embryo: The unborn young "from conception until approximately the end of the
second month" of gestation. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 515 (1966).
10 Fetus: "The unborn young . . . from the end of the eighth week to the moment of
birth." Id. at 587.
11 A "quick child" is defined as a child "that has developed so that it moves within the
mother's womb." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1415 (4th ed. 1968). "Quickening" is "the first
motion of the foetus in the womb felt by the mother." Id.
12 "Viable" is a term "applied to a newly-born infant, and especially to one prematurely
born.., but in such a state of organic development as to make possible the continuance of its
life." Id. at 1737. "Viability" means "capable of living" an independent existence outside
the mother's womb. Id.
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unclear since the law's use of such words reflects little, if any, consistency with
current medical theories or even with the actual definitions of the words themselves. Thus, the phrase "unborn child" will be used in this note to describe
all stages of gestation from conception to birth, and any reference to the other
above-mentioned terms will reflect the actual definition of the term unless otherwise qualified by the context.
II.
A.

The Historical Framework

The Law of Property and the Unborn Child

The property rights of the unborn child are as old as the common law itself.
Blackstone has stated:
An infant in [sic] ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in
law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a
surrender of a copyhold estate, made to it. It may have a guardian assigned
to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take afterwards by such limitation, as if 1it3 were then actually born. And in this point
the civil law agrees with ours.
Essentially, Blackstone was restating numerous prior decisions of the English
courts delineating the property rights of the unborn child. In the case of Wallis
v. Hodson, 4 an English court, relying on the Roman civil law, as well as the
common law, held that a posthumous child was entitled to an accounting of her
father's intestate estate. The Lord Chancellor stated: "[B]oth by the rules of
common and civil law, she [the unborn child] was, to all intents and purposes,
a child, as much as if born in the father's life-time."' 5 Following the same reasoning in Wallis, a second English court, in Doe v. Clarke,"6 interpreted the ordinary
meaning of "children" in a will to include a child en ventre sa mere. The Lord
Chief Justice stated: "I hold that an infant en ventre sa mere, who by the course
and order of nature is then living, comes clearly within the description of 'children
living at the time of his decease.' "'7
Nevertheless, it appears that for some time many of the English courts considered the recognition of the unborn child in the law of property to be a rule
of construction invoked for the benefit of the child. This contention was soon
rejected, however, in the case of Thellusson v. Woodford' where the court,
addressing itself to this point, said: "Why should not children en ventre sa mere
13 W. BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARMS *130.
14 26 Eng. Rep. 472 (Oh. 1740). This was not the first reported case where the English
courts protected the property rights of the unborn child. Earlier cases include Marsh v. Kirby,

21 Eng. Rep. 512 (Oh. 1634) (a gift of rents and profits from certain leases to a child en
ventre sa mere held to be valid); Hale v. Hale, 24 Eng. Rep. 25 (Oh. 1692) (posthumous
child held to be within the meaning of a trust created for testator's children who shall be living
at his death); Burdet v. Hopegood, 24 Eng. Rep. 484 (Oh. 1718) (gift over to testator's cousin
in case testator should leave no son at time of his death held not to have taken effect owing to
birth of posthumous son).
15

26 Eng. Rep. at 473.

16
17

126 Eng. Rep. (O.P. 1795).
Id. at 618.

18

31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1798).
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be considered generally as in existence? They are entitled to all the privileges
of other persons.""m The same court, in reply to the contention that a devise for
the life of a child en ventre sa mere was void because such a child was a nonentity, said:
Let us see, what this non-entity can do. He may be vouched in a recovery,
though it is for the purpose of making him answer over in value. He may
be an executor. He may take under the Statute of Distributions. . .. He
may take by devise. He may be entitled under a charge for raising
portions.
20
He may have an injunction; and he may have a guardian.
A few years after Thellusson, another English court went so far as to hold
that an unborn child is within the meaning of a bequest of a trust to children
"born in her [testatrix's] lifetime."'" In this case the court reasoned from past
decisions that "born in the lifetime" and "living at the death" would both include
a child en ventre sa mere since such a child was considered born for purposes
of the law.2
When the common law rules of property were adopted by the American
courts, the English decisions remained persuasive precedent. In Hall v. Hancock,"
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dealt with the question of whether
a grandchild born almost nine months after the death of the testator was entitled
to share with his four brothers in a bequest of his grandfather. The bequest was
to certain grandchildren "as may be living at my decease."2 4 After stating that
the jury was properly instructed that a child is to be considered in esse at a period
commencing nine months prior to his birth, the court held that a child en ventre
sa mere is within the description of "children living."2
In 1869, the Supreme Court of Missouri was faced with the question of
whether a contingent remainder could vest in an unborn child.
The court's
answer was explicit: "A child unborn will now not only inherit all manner of
estates, but take remainders, whether vested or contingent, as though living when
27
the particular estate determined ....
Several years later, the Indiana Supreme Court held that where a testator
devised property to his daughter "and her children" and a child .was en ventre
sa mere at the time of the testator's death, the unborn child could take as a tenant
in common with his own mother.2" The unborn child, therefore, had equal right
and title to the property with his mother.
19 Id. at 164.
20 Id. at 163.
21 Trower v. Butts, 57 Eng. Rep. 72 (Ch. 1823).
22 Id. at 74. The court relied heavily on the decision in Doe v. Lancashire, 101 Eng. Rep.
28 (K.B. 1792), where the court stated that it knew "of no argument, founded on law and
natural justice, in favour of the child who is born during his father's life, that does not equally
extend to a posthumous child." Id. at 37.
23 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834).
24 Id. at 257.
25 Id. at 257-58. Accord, Crowles v. Crowles, 56 Conn. 240, 13 A. 414 (1887); Swain
v. Bowers, 91 Ind. 307, 158 N.E. 598 (1927); King v. Rea, 56 Ind. 1 (1877); Mackie v.
Mackie, 230 N.C. 152, 52 S.E.2d 352 (1949); In re Laird, 85 Pa. 339 (1877).
26 Aubuchon v. Bender, 44 Mo. 560 (1869).
27 Id. at 568.
28 Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352 (1882).
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1907 held that a posthumous child inherits equally with her brothers and sisters as a tenant in common
and that any attempted partition and sale of the property without the consent
of the unborn child (or her guardian) is not effective against that child. 29 It was
the court's opinion that the child's inheritance vested immediately upon the death
of her father even though she was at the time still in her mother's womb. As
the court said:
If we hold, as we must, that the inheritance vested immediately in the plaintiff, while en ventre sa mere, upon the death of the father, the conclusion
must follow that such inheritance ought not be divested and the child's
estate destroyed by judicial proceedings to which it was in no form or manner
a party, and for which not even a guardian ad litem was appointed.30
The property rights of the unborn child progressed to such a point that in
1938 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that a posthumous child was
entitled to sharelin the income of a trust from the date of her father's death
rather than from the date of her subsequent birth. 1 In this case, it was the cQurt's
opinion that there was "no sound reason" for treating the posthumous child
differently from her brothers and sisters in this matter. 2
In 1941, a New York court in In re Holthausen's Will' 3 summed up the

evolution of the law to that point concerning the property rights of the unborn
child:
It has been the uniform and unvarying decision of all common law courts
in respect of estate matters for at least the past two hundred years that a
child en ventre sa mere is "born" and "alive" for all purposes for his
benefit.34

The last phase of the court's statement, indicating that the property rights of the
unborn child will not be recognized if they are not to the benefit of that child,
is a matter of dispute at the present time. It was pointed out earlier that the
English courts have rejected such a construction. It seems, however, that some
American courts still adhere to such a rule."5 Nevertheless, many of the cases
indicate that such a rule of construction is, as a practical matter, seldom followed.
Thus, in Barnett v. Pinkston6 a child en ventre sa mere at the time of her father's
death was held to be a "living child" so that the remainder of an estate would
vest in her at that time. However, no benefit ever accrued to the child since she
died several hours after. birth, leaving her mother as sole heir. 7 Again, in In re
29 Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907).
30 Id. at 158, 56 S.E. at 692; accord, Botsford v. O'Conner, 57 Ill. 72 (1870).
31 Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 61 R.I. 169, 200 A. 467 (1938).
32 Id. at 176, 200 A. at 476.

33 175 Misc. 1022, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sur. Ct. 1941).
34 Id. at 1024, 26 N.Y.S.2d at 143.

35 See In re Well's Will, 129 Misc. 447, 221 N.Y.S. 714 '(Sur. Ct. 1927); In re Scanelli,
208 Misc. 804, 142 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sur. Ct. 1955); In re Peabody, 5 N.Y.2d 541, 158 N.E.2d
841, 186 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1959); M'Knight v. Read, 1 Whart. 213 (Pa. 1835).
36 238 Ala. 327, 191 So. 371 (1939).
37 Accord, Catholic Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Firnane, 50 Mich. 82, 14 N.W. 707 (1883).
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Sankey's Estate8 a child en ventre sa mere, although entitled to share in the estate
in question, was held to be bound by an adjudication against the other heirs
which adversely affected the estate. The child was held to be a living heir
although she gained no benefit from it.
Probably the best statement on this point came from an English court in
1903." The court was confronted with an intricately worded devise whereby
it was to the plaintiff's detriment to be considered "born" at the time of the
testatrix's death and therefore take under the terms of the devise rather than by
rules of descent. Judge Buckley, writing for the majority, stated:
In my judgment, therefore, the doctrine in question - by which a child

en ventre sa mere is to be treated as existing for many purposes . . is one

which is applicable, not only where it is to the advantage of the child to
or not,
apply it, or where it is immaterial to the child whether it is applied
4
but also where it is to the disadvantage of the child to apply it. 0

It seems clear, therefore, that the law of property recognizes the rights of
the unborn child from the moment of conception for all purposes which affect
the property rights of that child. The unborn child may be an actual income
recipient prior to the time of his birth 4' as well as a tenant in common with his
own mother.42 He is considered an existing person at the time of his father's
death and is thereby a beneficiary entitled to participate in any damages recovered in an action for the wrongful death of his father."' Likewise, the unborn
child is recognized as a living heir for the purpose of taking any estate, whether
by devise or by the statutes of descent. Some states have even gone to the extent
of codifying this rule." For example, section 250 of California's Probate Code
provides that "a posthumous child is considered as living at the death of the
parent." Similarly, section 255 of California's Probate Code, as amended in
1961, provides that an illegitimate child is the heir of his mother, whether the
child is "born or conceived." There is little doubt, therefore, that the legal life
of a human being begins at conception for purposes of the law of property.
B. The Law of Torts and the Unborn Child
The most recent and most dramatic developments relating to the unborn
child have been in the law of torts.4 5 It was the common law belief that the
unborn child was part of the mother, and thus the child who had been harmed
by negligent injury to his mother could not recover since the mother was the
38 199 Cal. 391. 249 P. 517 (1926).
39 In re Wilmer's Trusts [1903], 1 Oh. 874.
40 Id. at 888.
41 Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 61 R.I. 169, 200 A. 467 (1938).
42 Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352 '(1882).
43 Herndon v. St. Louis & S.F. R. Co., 37 Okla. 256, 128 P. 727 (1912).
44 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(13) '(1966); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14-115, 32-102
(1948); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 228 (West 1970).
45 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 56 (3d ed. 1964). Excellent
articles on the law of prenatal injuries include: Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MicH. L.
Rav. 579 (1965); Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal
Injuries, 110 U. PENN. L. REv. 554 (1962); Note, The Law of PrenatalInjuries, 37 U. CoLo.
L. REV. 271 '(1965).
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only "person" who had been injured. This view was reiterated by Mr. Justice
Holmes, while still on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in the first and most
famous American case on the subject of prenatal injuries."' In this case, the
child's mother, four or five months pregnant at the time, slipped and fell on a
negligently maintained highway in the town of Northampton. There was evidence that the fall brought on a miscarriage and the prematurely born infant
lived for only ten or fifteen minutes. The administrator of the dead child's estate
sued the town for negligent maintenance of the highway. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, held that the common law provided no remedy for such injuries
and that "as the unborn child was part of the mother at the time of the injury,
any damage to it ,which was not too remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable by her." 47
A few years later, a further obstacle to recovery for prenatal injuries was
presented by the case of Walker v. GreatNorthern Railway Company48 in which
it was suggested that to entertain such actions would subject the courts to impossible problems of proof and even fictitious suits.49
These decisions were followed universally for a number of years, but their
basic premise was questioned in 1900 by Judge Boggs in his dissenting opinion in
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp.50 Judge Boggs argued that a child should be considered a separate legal entity when he reaches the prenatal stage of viability at
which he could survive apart from his mother. He took issue with the common
law rule stated by Holmes a few years earlier:
[I]t is but to deny a palpable fact to argue there is but one life, and that the
life of the mother. Medical science and skill and experience have demonstrated that at a period of gestation in advance of the period of parturition
the foetus is capable of independent and separate life, and that though within
the body of the mother, it is not merely a part of her body ... 51
Although some courts took notice of this dissenting opinion, it was not
followed during the early part of this century.5 2 Finally, in 1946, a federal district
court in the case of Bonbrest v. Kotz s rejected the Dietrich-Walker rule and
46 Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). There was an earlier
Iowa case which held that a father could not recover damages for being deprived of offspring

from one who performed an abortion on his wife, but the court, while expressing some doubt,

,specifically avoided the question of whether the plaintiff could have recovered on a claim for

future services to be rendered after the birth of the child. Kausz v. Ryan, 51 Iowa 232, 1
N.W.
47
48
49

485 (1879).
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. at 17.
28 L.R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891).
Another reason, probably the main reason, that the court denied recovery in this case

was that there was no contractual relationship between the railroad and the infant. One author
has styled this reasoning as "conceptualistic jurisprudence with a vengeance." 19 NAccA L.J.
232 (1957).
50 184 IU. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
51 Id. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641.

52 See, e.g., Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 354, 78 S.W.2d
944, 946-47 (1935); Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 274-75, 159
N.W. 916, 917 (1916).
53 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). There were a few earlier decisions of somewhat less
notable influence: Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (Dist. Ct. App.),
aff'd per curiam, 93 P.2d 562 (1939) (decision based on statute); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.
2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923) (civil-law decision); Montreal Tramways Co. v. Leveille [1933],
4 D.L.R. 337 '(civil-law decision).
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permitted recovery for a prenatal injury. Bonbrest involved a medical malpractice action. The infant plaintiff (a "viable child") sought recovery for
,injuries sustained while in the process of being "removed from his mother's
womb." Noting the earlier decisions, including the opinion of Justice Holmes
in Dietrich, the court stated:
As to a viable child being "part" of its mother- this argument seems to me
to be a contradiction in terms. True it is in the womb, but it is capable now
of extrauterine life - and while dependent for its continued development
on sustenance derived from its peculiar relationship to its mother, it is not
a "part" of the mother in the sense of a constituent element -as
that term
is generally understood. Modem medicine is replete with cases of living
children being taken from dead mothers. Indeed, apart from viability, a nonviable foetus is not part of its mother.54 (Emphasis added.)
As to the difficulty of proof of such prenatal injuries, the court stated: "The law
is presumed to keep pace with the sciences and medical science certainly has made
progress since 1884. We are concerned here only with the right and not its
implementation.""5
More than any other case, Bonbrest has proven to be the landmark decision
in the area of prenatal injuries. The importance of Bonbrest, besides being what
Prosser termed "the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well-settled rule in the
whole history of the law of torts,1 5 6 was that it established viability as the minimum point at which recovery should be allowed. s7 With viability as the test for
recovery, the Dietrich-Walker rule has been so widely repudiated that only two
jurisdictions that considered the question prior to Bonbrest have not yet overruled
their pre-Bonbrest decisions."8 At the present time, the right to recover for prenatal injuries has been recognized by twenty-nine states " and the District of
54 65 F. Supp. at 140.
55 Id. at 143.
56 W. PROSSER, supra note 45, at 354.
57 "Here, however, we have a viable child - one capable of living outside the womb and which has demonstrated its capacity to survive by surviving - are we to say now it has
no locus standi in court or elsewhere?" Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946).
58 Alabama and Michigan have not yet overruled prior decisions. Stanford v. St. LouisSan Francisco Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926); Newman v. City of Detroit, 281
Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937).
59 California: Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (Dist. Ct. App.
1939), aff'd per curiam, 93 P.2d 562 (1939) (decision based on statute); Connecticut: Tursi
v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (Super. Ct. 1955) ; Delaware:
Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Georgia: Tucker v.
Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951); Fallow v. Hobbs,
113 Ga. App. 181, 147 S.E.2d 517 (1966); Illinois: Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d
412 (1953); Rodriguez v. Patti, 415 Ill. 496, 114 N.E.2d 721, rev'g 348 Ill. App. 322, 108
N.E.2d 830 (1952); Iowa: Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (D.C. Iowa 1960) (applying
Iowa law); Kansas: Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Kentucky: Mitchell
v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 '(Ky. 1955); Louisiana: Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct.
App. 1923); Maryland: Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Massachusetts: Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960);
Minnesota: Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Mississippi:
Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Missouri: Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo.
1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953); Nevada: White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969); New
Hampshire: Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); New Jersey: Smith
v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); New York: Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349,
102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953);
North Carolina: Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968) (action would
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Columbia.60 Compensation for prenatal injuries has also been allowed under the
Federal Tort Claims Act in an action against the United States. 1
A few states have consistently denied recovery on the grounds that such a
cause of action can only be authorized by the legislature because it did not exist
at common law.6 2 Such a theory, however, seems to be unfounded since the
former rule denying recovery was really a judicial, rather than a legislative, rule
to begin with. The Ohio Supreme Court strongly refuted such reasoning some
twenty years ago when it stated: "No legislative action is required to authorize
recovery for personal injuries caused by the negligence of another. Such right was
one existing at common law."6 3 Other courts have recognized the right of
recoyery for prenatal injuries even in those cases in which causal connection is
most difficult to establish.64 - Furthermore, the trend at the present time is to
allow recovery without regard to whether or not the child was viable at the time
the injury was inflicted. The 1953 New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
decision in Kelly v. Gregory," which dealt with an injury to an unborn child in
the third month of pregnancy, was the first to reject viability as the point at which
the rights of the unborn child begin. The court's opinion reflects the increasing

knowledge of medical science:
While the point at which the foetus becomes viable has been of usefulness
in drawing some legal distinctions, the underlying problem that has usually
troubled the Judges who have written on the subject of recovery for prenatal
injuries, has been in fixing the point of legal separability from the mother.
We ought to be safe in this respect in saying that legal separability
should begin where there is biological separability. We know something

more of the actual process of conception and foetal development now than
when some of the common law cases were decided; and what we know makes
it possible to demonstrate clearly that separability begins at conception.66
(Emphasis added:)
have been maintainable if child had lived or if damages resulting from the death could have
been proved); Ohio: Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d
334 (1949); Oregon: Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955); Pennsylvania: Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Rhode Island: Sylvia v. Gobeille,
220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966) South Carolina: Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790
(1960); Tennessee: Shousha v. Matthews Driveurself Serv., Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d
471 (1962); Texas: Leal v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967):
Washington: Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash.2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962); West
Virginia: Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (D.C. W. Va. 1969) (wrongful death
action applying West Virginia law); Wisconsin: Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
34 Wis.2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
60 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 '(D.D.C. 1946).
61 Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. S.C. 1960) ($260,000 damages awarded
to a child who was unable to see, talk, use limbs, or control muscles as a result of prenatal injuries inflicted during the sixth month of gestation).
62 Michigan is one such state. Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710
(1937). However, a recent decision by the Michigan Court of Appeals, Marlow v. Krapek, 20
Mich. App. 489, 174 N.W.2d 172 (1969), in which a child sued for prenatal injuries inflicted
only eight hours before birth, may reverse the trend in that state. The court of appeals noted
that Michigan's prior holdings Were against the weight of authority, but held that only the
state supreme court could reverse such decisions.
63 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 128, 87 N.E.2d 334, 340
(1949).
64 See, e.g., Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197,Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951) (child born
blind); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225 '(1955) (child developed cerebral
palsy) ; Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (child born a Mongoloid)..
'65 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
66 Id. at 543-44, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
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Since Kelly, a number of courts have recognized that the basis for recovery in
tort is causation-not some theory of separability that begins at the highly relative
point at which a child becomes viable. 7 All logic is in favor of ignoring the stage
at which an injury occurs to the human child in utero." The argument was well
stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ten years ago:
As for the notion that the child must have been viable when the injuries were
received, which has claimed the attention of several of the states, we regard
it as having little to do with the basic right to recover, when the foetus is
regarded as69having existence as a separate creature from the moment of
conception.

No doubt more courts will recognize the inherent problem in a position which
allows recovery only to the viable unborn child. Indeed, it has been said that
judicial disallowance of actions for injuries to the non-viable child may well
be a denial of the most meritorious claims70 and a potential for injustice.7 Certainly the closer one gets to the estimated time of conception, the more difficult
will the plaintiff's burden of proof become, but this should not defeat the right
of action if that casual link between the plaintiff's condition and the defendant's
wrongful act can be established. The courts seem to have recognized this fact,
and the viability limitation in prenatal injury cases appears to be headed for
oblivion.
A further development in the law of torts has been the recognition of the
right to maintain an action for the wrongful death of a child resulting from prenatal injuries. Where the child is born alive and then subsequently dies as a
result of injuries received prior to birth, the courts which have considered the
question are almost unanimous in allowing the child's estate to bring an action
for wrongful death. 2 Although the cause of action for wrongful death is purely
statutory, the child born alive has always been considered a "person"' regardless
of how short a time he actually survives. Thus, in Torigian u. Watertown News
Co.,7 the Massachusetts court allowed recovery on behalf of an infant who died
67 At least nine states have now rejected the viability distinction in allowing recovery for
prenatal injuries: Georgia: Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d
727 (1956) (one month); Illinois: Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691
(1961) (one month); Massachusetts: Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225
N.E.2d 926 (1967) (3/
months); New Hampshire: Bennet v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147
A.2d 108 (1958) (non-viable); New Jersey: Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497
(1960) (six months); New York: Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696
(1953) (three months); Pennsylvania: Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960)
(one month); Rhode Island: Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 '(R.I. 1966) (non-viable);
Wisconsin: Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959) (suggested that viability would make no difference in this state, but dismissed the case for lack of
proof that injuries inflicted at twelfth week of pregnancy caused plaintiff to be born a Mongoloid); see also, Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951), where no reference to viability is made.
68 W. PRossER, supra note 45, at 356.
69 Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960).
70 Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries,
110 U. PENN. L. REv. 554, 563 (1962).
71 Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MIcE. L. Rv.
579, 589 (1965).
72 See cases cited at note 59 supra. All of these states appear to allow an action for wrongful death on behalf of the child born alive with the exception of North Carolina, where the
sole basis for recovery in any wrongful death action is provable pecuniary damages. It appears
that if the parents could somehow prove such damages, the cause of action would be allowed.
73 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 '(1967).
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2Y hours after birth as a result of injuries sustained during the fourth month of
gestation.
The most significant developments in the evolution of the unborn child's
rights in tort are those decisions which allow the parents, or survivors, to maintain
a wrongful death action where the child is stillborn.7 In these cases, the unborn
child to whom live birth never comes is held to be a "person" who may be the
subject of an action for damages arising from his death. 5 At the present time,
sixteen states have decided that a cause of action exists for the wrongful death
of a child who is stillborn." In one such state, Connecticut, a court stated:
To deny the infant or its representative relief in this type of case is not only
a harsh result but its effect is to do reverence to an outmoded, timeworn
fiction not founded on fact and within common knowledge untrue and
unjustified. 77

In the most recent decision on this point, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded:
It is no less a loss to the survivors where, as here, the child died before
birth; and it is clear that the Legislature intended that whatever loss there
is should be compensated. Respondent's argument that damages would be
difficult of proof does not go to the validity of a cause of action.78
The present weight of authority favoring recovery for the wrongful death of a
stillborn child 9 leads to the conclusion that those states which have denied
74 See Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 992 (1967).
75 Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16
U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 233, 244 (1969).
76 Connecticut: Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Gorke
v. LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Delaware: Worgan v. Greggo &
Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Georgia: Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App.
712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Iowa: Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960) '(applymag Iowa law); Kansas: Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Kentucky:
Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Louisiana: Valence v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1951); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923)
(dictum); Maryland: State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964);
Minnesota: Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Mississippi: Rainey
v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Nevada: White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617 '(Nev.
1969); New Hampshire: Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Ohio:
Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); South Carolina: Fowler v.
Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); West Virginia: Panagopoulous v. Martin,
295 F. Supp. 220 '(S.D. W.Va. 1969) (applying West Virginia law); Wisconsin: Kwaterski
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967); see also, Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964), upholding recovery for wrongful death of stillborn
child, applying Pennsylvania law on first impression. However, a later case decided by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the opposite view. Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d
9 (1964).
77 Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 360, 224 A.2d 406, 407 (1966).
78 White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617, 623 (Nev. 1969).
79 The annotation on this subject in 15 A.L.R.3d 992 (1967) lists only eleven states that
have denied recovery for the wrongful death of a stillborn child, while, as indicated above,
sixteen states have permitted recovery. In addition to those twenty-seven states that have
taken a particular side in the controversy, two other states have considered the question. In
Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D.C. Alaska 1962), the court held that there could be no
recovery on behalf of a non-viable stillborn child. But the court clearly suggests that there
would exist a cause of action on behalf of a viable stillborn child. Similarly, in Acton v.
Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363 '(Mo. 1965), the court held that the aunt and uncle of an unborn
child did not have a cause of action for wrongful death because they could prove no pecuniary
damages. However, if the action "was brought by the father of a deceased infant," said the
court, "it might present a different question." Id. at 367.
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recovery may well reconsider their position in the near future.8 1 Indeed, it seems
inconsistent for a jurisdiction to permit recovery for prenatal injuries to the child
born alive but to deny recovery to a child whose prenatal injuries inflicted by the
tortfeasor are severe enough to cause stillbirth."' As the Maryland Supreme Court
observed: "The cause of action arose at the time of the injury, and... [there is]
no more reason why it should be cut off because of the child's death before birth,
82
than if it died thereafter.
Consequently, in recognizing a cause of action for injury inflicted before
birth, the law has recognized the legal interests and personality of the unborn
child. The courts realize that "[m]edical authorities have long recognized that a
child is in existence from the moment of conception."8 " If one accepts the trend
of modern tort cases, he must conclude that Professor Prosser was correct-"the
unborn child in the path of an automobile is as much a person in the street as
the mother."8 4
C. Equity and the Unborn Child
Equity has, on occasion, become involved with the rights of the unborn
child. While there appear to be few reported cases in which the English equity
courts were called upon to decide the rights of the unborn child, there is some
mention made of Lutterel's case in which an injunction was granted on behalf of
an infant en ventre sa mere to prevent waste. 5 There is also the 1678 case of
Hyde v. Seymour"8 in which the court decided that an unborn child was entitled
to a share of the profits of a trust established for the devisor's children. For the
most part, however, equity's protection of the unborn child is a rather recent
development in the law.
In Kyne v. Kyne,r an unborn child came before the court by a guardian
ad litem for the purpose of compelling the father to provide support. The court
held that the child had such a right and that the father had such a duty.88 The
80 Michigan is one of those states that has up to now denied recoVery for the wrongful
death of an unborn child; but has apparently done so at the cost of some internal inconsistency.
The problem stems from the fact that while the Michigan court has denied that an unborn
child is a "person" within the meaning of that state's wrongful death statute, Estate of Powers
v. City of Troy, 4 Mich. App. 572, 145 N.W.2d 418 (1966), aff'd, 380 Mich. 160, 156 N.W.2d
530 (1968), the same court has held that an unborn child is a "person" within the meaning
of that state's "dram shop" act and was thus allowed to bring an action for loss of support
occasioned by the death of the child's father. LaBlue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d
445 (1960). The explanation of the court was that the latter case was essentially decided
under the rules of property law while the former was one in tort.
81 Before the enactment of the wrongful death statutes in the late 1800's, a somewhat
similarly ironical situation existed in the law of torts with regard to all persons. If the
claimant was simply injured, he could recover damages; but if he died, the cause of action
was said to die with him. Thus, it was rumored that the fire axes carried by railroad coaches
were actually intended for use on those passengers who were merely injured in a train accident.
W. PROSSER, supra note 45, at 924.
82 State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md.179, 198 A.2d 71. 73 (1964).
83 Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 362, 157 A.2d 497, 502 (1960).
84 W. PROSSER, supra note 45, at 355.
85 Cited in Hale v. Hale, 24 Eng. Rep. 25, 26 (Ch. 1695).
86 22 Eng. Rep. 1046 (Ch. 1678); see also, Gibson v. Gibson, 22 Eng. Rep. 1173 '(Ch.
1698).
87 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 100 P.2d 806 (1940).
88 Accord, People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. 782, 298 P. 961 (1931); Metzger v. People, 98
Colo. 133, 53 P.2d 1189 (1936).
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rationale of such a decision is based primarily on the rights that the unborn child
has always enjoyed in property law.
More crucial decisions, bearing directly on the unborn child's right to life,
have been handed down during the past decade. In one such instance, 9 where
there was a possibility that a'child might be born a "blue baby," it was held that
the state, in the interest of the child's welfare, had a right to authorize the hospital
to give lifesaving transfusions, even though the parents objected on religious
grounds. The court made it quite clear that the state, pursuant to its parens
patriae jurisdiction, not only had a right but also a duty to protect the children
within its jurisdiction-including an unborn child-notwithstanding the wishes
of the parents. Another such case, perhaps the most noteworthy one on equity's
protection of the unborn child, is Raleigh Fitkin-PaulMorgan Memorial Hosp.
v. Anderson."0 The New Jersey Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a
pregnant Jehovah's Witness could be compelled to submit to a blood transfusion
when such transfusions were contrary to her religious beliefs. The court, admitting
that it was a "difficult question,"'" unanimously decided that the unborn child was
entitled to the law's protection, and ordered the transfusions. The court stated:
In State v. Perricone ...we held that the State's concern for the welfare

of an infant justified blood transfusions notwithstanding the objection of the
parents who were also Jehovah's Witnesses, and in Smith v. Brennan . ..
we held that a child could sue for injuries negligently inflicted upon it prior
to birth. We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law's protection and that an appropriate order should be made to insure blood transthey are necessary in the opinion of
fusions to the mother in the event that
the physician in charge at the time.92 (Emphasis added.)
It is interesting to note that the New Jersey Supreme Court did not rest its
decision in Anderson on the principle that the state could compel the transfusions
in order to save the life of the woman. Instead the court held that the transfusions
were to be given in order to save the life of the unborn child. The unborn child's
right to live could not be negated by the mother's asserted constitutional right of
religious expression; the child's right to life was paramount. In a subsequent
New Jersey case in 1967,' 3 the parents of a child born with serious defects in
sight, hearing, and speech brought suit against their obstetrician for failure to advise them of the risk of birth defects where the mother had contracted German
measles during pregnancy. The parents of the child sought to recover damages
for the emotional distress and the added financial burden of rearing a defective
child. The parents' theory was that if the doctor had told them of the risks, they
would have procured an abortion and thereby have avoided the emotional and
financial burdens. The court rejected the parents' claim on the ground that the
89 Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Supp. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (Juv. Ct. 1961).
90

91

42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).

See Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Il1.2d 361, 205
N.E.2d 435 (1965). Both of these decisions, although decided in retrospect, seem to suggest
that a non-pregnant adult of sound mind may refuse a blood transfusion and choose to die.
92 Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201 A.2d
537, 538.
93 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
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unborn child's right to life was of greater importance than the interest of the
parents in being free from emotional and financial injury. The majority of the
court stated the case in this manner:
It is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold onto it however
heavily burdened. If Jeffrey could have been asked as to whether his life
should be snuffed out before his full term of gestation could run its course,
our felt intuition of human nature tells us he would almost surely choose
life with defects as against no life at all. "For the living there is hope, but
for the dead there is none." Theocritus.94
What these cases indicate is that the unborn child not only has a recognized
legal right to own property and to be free from negligent injury or death at the
hands of a tortfeasor, but also that he has a recognized legal right to life itself. 5
The law has protected the life of the unborn child against the assertion of such a
fundamental constitutional right as the freedom. of religion. Undoubtedly, the
reason is that the law has recognized a countervailing constitutional right belonging to the unborn child.
D. The CriminalLaw and the Unborn Child
Any consideration of the criminal law's recognition of the unborn child
must take a twofold approach involving both criminal abortion and homicide.
One of the earliest references to the criminal nature of abortion was by the
thirteenth-century English jurist, Henry Bracton. Bracton wrote: "If there be anyone who strikes a pregnant woman or gives her a poison whereby he causes an
abortion, if the foetus be already formed or animated, and especially if it be animated, he commits homicide." 9 There seem to be no reported cases, however,
supporting Bracton's view that the malicious destruction of a viable fetus is
murder-unless, of course, it had been born alive and then subsequently died.
The "born-alive" rule has been associated most frequently with the writings of
Sir Edward Coke. Coke observed:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in
her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in her body, and
she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprision, and no murder;
but if the childe be born alive and dyeth of the potion, battery, or other
cause, this is murder; for in law it is7 accounted a reasonable creature, in
rerum natura, when it is born alive.9
In the eighteenth century, Blackstone reiterated the position set forth by
Coke:
94
95

Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
This right to life is also evident from the fact that from the early common law to the

present day the law has provided for the suspension of execution of pregnant women sentenced
to death. Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16

U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 233, 240 (1969).
96 BRACTON, THE LAws AND CUSTOMS

OF ENGLAND,

III, ii, 4, quoted and translated in

Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 16641968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 419 (1968).
97 3 COKE, INSTITUTES *58 (1648).
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Life is the immediate gift of God . . and it begins in contemplation of
law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if a woman
is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it in her womb;
or if anyone beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But the modern law doth not look upon this offense
in quite so atrocious a light but merely as a heinous misdemeanor. 9
The common law rule that the unborn child could not be the subject of
homicide was therefore well established.99 In fact, at common law the abortion of
an unborn child prior to quickening was no crime at all if the woman consented;
if the woman did not consent to the abortion, the offense was merely an assault
and battery. 00
As a result of the development of the common law theory, statutory protection of the unborn child became a necessity. In 1803, England enacted its
first abortion statute, the Miscarriage of Women Act.' This Act largely abolished
the common law rule, but it retained a distinction between the quickened and
the unquickened child in determining the severity of the punishment. The law condemned the willful, malicious, and unlawful use of any medical substance with the

intent to induce an abortion, without regard to whether the attempt was successful, or whether the mother died as a result.'
Parliament recognized a justifiable interest in protecting the life of the unborn child; and the statute made
abortion ("willfully and maliciously") a felony in every case, but punishable
by death only if the medical substance was administered after quickening. The
Act was subsequently amended in 1828, again in 1837, and finally incorporated
into the Offenses Against the Persons Act of 1861.103 By this time the law was
settled in England that the killing of an unborn child was a felony regardless
of whether the child had "quickened."
Much the same pattern developed in the United States. In 1797, a Pennsylvania court, adhering to the common law rule, held that it was necessary to prove
that a child was born alive in order to support a murder indictment since an
unborn child or a child born dead could not be the subject of homicide.'"°
Similarly, the many cases that considered the abortion question followed
the common law rule that it was not an indictable offense to cause the mis98 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129-30.
99 On this point, a number of cases decided in the mid-nineteenth century, in which a
woman or her accomplice was charged with murdering a newborn child, uniformly declared
the law to be that a verdict of murder could not be returned unless it was proved that the
child was born alive since an unborn child could not be the subject of homicide. Regina v.
Trilloe, 174 Eng. Rep. 674 '(N.P. 1842); Regina v. Wright, 173 Eng. Rep. 1039 (N.P. 1841);
Regina v. Reeves, 173 Eng. Rep. 724 (N.P. 1839); Rex v. Sells, 173 Eng. Rep. 370 (N.P.
1837); Rex v. Crutchley, 173 Eng. Rep. 355 (N.P. 1836); Rex v. Bain, 172 Eng. Rep. 1272
(N.P. 1834); Rex. v. Enoch, 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (N.P. 1833); Rex v. Poulton, 172 Eng. Rep.
997 (N.P. 1832).
100 CLARx & MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CrimEs § 292 at 394 (5th ed.
1952).
101 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58 (1803), cited in Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal
Foundations, 49 GEo. L.J. 395, 431-32 (1961). This excellent work contains a complete
history of English and American abortion statutes.
102 Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo. L.J. 395, 432

(1961).

103 Id.
104 State v. McKee, 1 Add. 1 (Pa. 1797).
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carriage of a child that had not yet quickened.0 5 Consequently, the states,
beginning with Connecticut in 1821, gradually enacted abortion laws providing
statutory protection for the unborn child.' There has been some disagreement as
to the original purpose of these abortion statutes--specifically, whether they were
meant to protect the life of the mother or the child. 1' 7 It is obvious that the
common law prohibition against abortion (after quickening) was meant to protect the child since, as Blackstone stated, life began in the contemplation of the
law when the child was felt to move in his mother's womb. This protection for
the child was unquestionably carried over into the early statutes since, under most
of those laws, the pregnant woman herself could commit the crime. °" In 1921,
Judge Roscoe Pound, sitting on the New York Court of Appeals, commented:
By the criminal law, such being the solicitude of the state to protect life
before birth, it is a great crime to kill the child after it is able to stir in'the
mother's womb by any injury inflicted upon the person of the mother ...
and it may be murder if the child is born alive and dies of prenatal injuries.
...If the mother with the intent to produce her own miscarriage produces
the death of the quick child whereof she is pregnant, she may be guilty of
manslaughter.... If the child is not quick, it may be felony' to produce a
miscarriage. 10 9
Nevertheless, many writers, relying on the fact that most statutes do not require
actual pregnancy for the crime of abortion to be committed, have concluded that
the main purpose of the statutes was, and still is, to protect the woman from the
dangers of the unskilled abortionist."' Whatever the purpose may have been, it
105 Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 Mass. 387 (1812); Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass.
(9 Met.) 263 (1845); State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52 (1849); Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48
(1851); Abrams v. Foshee, 3 Iowa 274 (1856); Smith v. Gafford, 31 Ala. 45 (1857).
In Cooper, the New Jersey Supreme Court, defining the common law rule, stated: "In
contemplation of law, life commences at the moment of quickening, at that moment when the
embryo gives the first physical proof of life, no matter when it first received it." State v.
Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52, 54 (1849).
However, it seems that Pennsylvania did not adhere to the common law rule relating to
abortion. In Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 630 (1850), the court held that an 'abortion
is punishable at common law in that state whether committed before or after the child has
become quick. The court stated: "[The offense] is the destruction of gestation. . . . The
moment the womb is instinct with embryo life and gestation has begun, the crime may be
perpetrated." Id. at 632.
106 Quay, supra note 102, at 435.
107 See G. WILLIAMS, TiiE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 153 (1957); Leavy
and Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 35 S. CAL. L. Riv.
123, 135 (1962).
108 The English abortion statutes provided that the woman herself could commit the crime
of abortion only if she was actually pregnant, while other persons could commit the crime if
the necessary intent was present without regard to whether the woman was actually pregnant
or not. In each case it was a felony. These statutes, in turn, became the model for the
American abortion laws. Quay, supra note 102, at 432-35.
It seems evident, therefore, that the abortion statutes were meant to serve the dual
purpose of protecting both the life of the child and the mother. See State v. Howard, 32 Vt.
380 (1859).
109 Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 222-23, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
110 See note 107 supra. Some courts, have strengthened this theory with statements such
as the New Jersey Supreme Court's in State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112 (1858); "The design
of the statute was not to prevent the procuring of abortions, so much as to guard the-health.
and life of the mother against the consequences of such attempts." Id. at 114. But another
justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court has specifically disagreed with the purport of this
statement and says that the statute was primarily meant to protect the child and the "secondary
objective" was to furnish protection for the life and health of the mother. Francis, J., concurring in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 699 (1967).
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is certain that these statutes afforded the unborn child a considerable amount of
legal protection-and probably actual legal recognition. Until 1967, every state
and the District of Columbia had t statute making abortiona crime unless it was
necessary to save the life of the mother."' Since then, sixteen states have revised
their statutes to allow abortion for a variety of reasons." In addition, the District
of Columbia and the State of Wisconsin are, to some extent, presently without
criminal abortion statutes due to recent court decisions holding these statutes unconstitutional."'

Many of the new abortion statutes actually go beyond what was allowed by
the common law. The common law prohibited abortion after quickening even
by the woman herself. Every one of the abortion revisions, however, permit
abortion after the time which is generally conceded to be the point of quickening
(14-20 weeks of the pregnancy" 4 ). Eight states"5 have provided no time limit at
all in their recent abortion revisions (which would suggest that in these states the
unborn child is subject to being killed at any moment of existence in the womb).
It would hardly be proper to classify this as a legal "reform," as the abortion
proponents have generally done. To paraphrase one author on the subject, no
utilitarian appeal can hide from the perceptive lawyer the hard fact that the
abortion "reforms" are not legal evolution, but revolution." 6 The new abortion
statute revisions are inconsistent with -the reason and logic that was itself the
common law. Furthermore, the demise of the criminal abortion statutes will
effectively remove the only protection that the law has provided for the unborn
child. As was pointed out above, the unborn child could not be the-subject of
homicide at common law." But some statutory protection for the unborn child
after quickening has been provided by feticide statutes in several states.'
These
statutes make it a separate offense (usually manslaughter) to kill an unborn quick
child willfully and under such circumstances that, had the mother rather than the
child been killed, the offense would have been murder. Even those writers who
111 The statutes are cited in GEORGE, Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Movements
for Reform, in ABORTION AND THE LAW 1 (Smith ed. 1967).
112 See statutes cited in note 3, supra.
113 See cases cited in note 2, supra.
114 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 207.11 (Tentative Draft No. 9,
1959) (comment).
115 Arkansas, Colorado (sixteen-week limit if pregnancy resulted from alleged rape or
incest), Georgia, Kansas, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. In
addition, California's new statute says: "In no event shall the termination of pregnancy be
approved after the 20th week of pregnancy." CAL. 'HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25953 (West
1969). The statute does not seem to prohibit the performance of an abortion after that time.
116 Louisell, supra note 95, at 248.
117 Supra notes 99, 104.
118 Arkansas: ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2223, 41-2224 (1964); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 782.09, 782.10 (1965); Georgia: GA. CODE AN'N. §§ 26-1101 to 1104, 26-9921a (1969
Revision); Michigan: MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.554, 28.555 (1954); Mississippi: Miss. CODE
ANN. § 2222 (1956); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 559.090, 559.100 (Vernon 1953);
Nevada: NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 200.210, 200.220 (1967); New York: N.Y. PENAL CODE §
125.00 (McKinney 1967); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12-2502, 12-2503
(1960); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 713,714 (1958)'.
A feticide statute was also enacted in England -in 1929. That act, known as the Infant
Life Preservation Act, prohibits the killing of any child which is capable of being born alive
and provides a penalty of life imprisonment upon conviction. Furthermore, compliance with
the Abortion Act of 1967, which legalizes abortion in certain circumstances in England is no
defense where a viable fetus has been destroyed. SMITH AND HooAN, CRIMINAL LAW 241-42
2d ed. (1969).
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favor liberalized abortion have admitted that "conceptually these [feticide]
statutes clearly accord independent personality to the fetus, for the killing of the
fetus under these circumstances is called manslaughter, and the sections themselves
are usually found with the other homicide sections.""'
Statutes of this type, it will be noted, do not require the child to be born
alive before he is entitled to the protection of the law. Under the feticide statutes,
both the quick child and the mother are human beings and to unlawfully kill
either constitutes homicide. 2
Despite these few statutory provisions which make the unborn child the
subject of homicide, however, live birth seems to be an absolute requirement to
sustain a conviction for homicide by the common law terms. The problem is not
only proving live birth but also defining it.'2 ' Some courts have held that there
must be proof that the child had an independent circulation in order to establish
live birth;" some have held that the fact the child has breathed is not sufficient in
itself to prove live birth; 2 others have required proof of both respiration and an
independent circulation;. 24 and it is the general rule that the birth must be complete, i.e., the whole body of the child must be expelled from the mother. 2 - There
is, however, a difference of opinion as to whether the umbilical cord must have
been severed.:"
In reaction to the vagueness and inconsistency of the law of homicide on this
subject, and, perhaps, in reaction to the fact that a child could be killed with
impunity when he was only partially expelled from his motheru 7 a California
court in 1947 held that a child in the process of being born is a human being
within the meaning of that state's homicide statute. s In fact, the court even
suggested that a viable unborn child could be the subject of homicide. The court
explained:
There is no sound reason why an infant should not be considered a human
being when born or removed from the body of its mother, when it has
reached that stage of development where it is capable of living an indeGEoRGE, supra note 111, at 11.
120 For an example of a recent prosecution under these statutes see Tiner v. State, 239 Ark.
819, 394 S.W.2d 608 (1965).
121 See generally Atkinson, Life, Birth and Live-Birth, 20 L. Q. Rlv. 134 (1904); Annot.,
159 A.L.R. 523 (1945).
122 Rex v. Enoch, 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (N.P. 1833); State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519
119

(1876).
123

Rex v. Enoch, 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (N.P. 1833). In this case, Justice Parke stated:
The child might breathe before it is born; but its having breathed is not sufficiently
life to make the killing of the child murder .... [T]here must have been an inde-

pendent circulation in the child, or the child cannot be considered as alive for this

purpose. Id.
See also Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 '(1923); Shedd v. State, 178
Ga. 653, 173 S.E. 847 (1934).
124 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295, 96 S.W.2d 1014 (Ct. App. 1936).
125 Cordes v. State, 54 Tex. Grim. 204, 112 S.W. 943, 947 '(1908); Rex v. Poulton, 172
Eng. Rep. 997, 998 (N.P. 1832).
126 State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519 (1876) (yes); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295,
96 S.W. 1014 '(Ct.App. 1936) (no).
127 One such case is Wallace v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. App. R. 570 (1880), where the court held
that the jury should acquit if they found that the woman had killed her child by tying a string
around its throat before the child was completely born. There was no crime unless the
strangulation occurred after complete birth.
128 People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
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pendent life as a separate being, and where in the natural cause of events
it will so live if given normal and reasonable care. It should equally be held
that a viable child in the process of being born is a human being within the
meaning of the 2 homicide
statutes, whether or not the process has been
9
fully completed.

Clearly, this is a more rational approach to the problem of independent life, and
a few courts who were troubled by the live-birth rule were quick to follow.3 0
Nevertheless, this decision has had almost no effect on the live-birth rule,
even in the state of California itself, as is shown by the recent California Supreme
Court decision in Keeler v. Superior Court.' In this case, the defendant was
indicted for the murder of a viable unborn child. The facts of the case are worth
mentioning. The defendant met his former wife on a narrow mountain road
near a home where she had been living with another man in a non-marital relationship. She was, at the time, approximately eight months pregnant by this
other man. The defendant forced her car to the side of the road with his car,
shouting: "I hear you are pregnant!" He opened the door of her car and pulled
her out by her arm. He then looked at her abdomen and said: "You sure are.
I'm going to stomp it out of you !" He then pushed her against the car and
kicked his knee into her abdomen. When the woman entered the hospital, a
Caesarian section was performed and the child was found to be dead as a result
of a fractured skull. 3 2 Expert medical testimony indicated that the baby girl "had
reached the 35th week of development, had a 96 percent chance of survival, and
was 'definitely' alive and viable at the time of death. . . .,13 The California
District Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the indictment stating that a
viable unborn child is a human being for the purpose of California's homicide
statute.'
The Supreme Court of California, however, dismissed the indictment,
reasoning that to hold the defendant liable for murder in light of the vast
precedent adhering to the live-birth rule would be tantamount to creating an ex
post facto law. The court refused to admit that the defendant could have anticipated from the Chavez..5 case that his actions would constitute murder. Two
justices, Burke and Sullivan, dissented on the theory that common sense and the
Chavez case should not be disregarded.
The irony of the Keeler decision is that, had the defendant's assault on the
unborn child been somewhat less severe or even less accurate so that the child was
born alive before she died from the injuries, the crime would dearly have been
129 Id. at 626, 176 P.2d at 94.
130 E.g., Singleton v. State, 33 Ala. 536, 35 So.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1948).
On the other hand, some courts went out of their way to acquit the defendant. One such
case is People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949). In this case, the defendant
admitted assisting in the birth of a child and also strangled the child with the umbilical
cord when the baby started to cry just as it was being born. The defendant further confessed
to decapitating the baby and then secretly disposing of the remains. The New York Court of
Appeals reversed the murder conviction on the grounds that there was not sufficient proof
that the child was both alive and wholly expelled from its mother's body when the strangulation occurred. The court attached no significance to the defendant's confessions.
131 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617 (1970).
132 Id. at 482, 470 P.2d at 618.
133 Id. at 494, 470 P.2d at 630 (dissenting opinion of Acting Chief Justice Burke).
134 Keeler v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. App. 324, 80 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1969).
135 People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
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murder." 6 It is therefore to the defendant's advantage to be sure that he has
killed, rather than merely injured, the child in utero. One would have to search
long and hard to find a better example of inverse justice at work. The Keeler
case will stand, at least, to refute the statement made in 1969 by retired United
States Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark that "[n]o prosecutor has ever returned
a murder indictment charging the taking of the life of the fetus."' 7 Indeed, not
only has a prosecutor returned the indictment, but a unanimous appeals court
has sustained it and two justices of a state supreme court have dissented against
dismissal of the indictment. It seems incredible that the life of a viable child in
the eighth month of pregnancy can be intentionally and maliciously destroyed
without any criminal redress on behalf of the dead child.
California was not the only state to recently consider the question whether
an unborn child can be the subject of homicide. In 1969, an Ohio court found
a defendant guilty of vehicular homicide in the death of a baby girl who was
stillborn during the seventh month of pregnancy as a result of an automobile
accident caused by the defendant's intoxicated condition. s The court held that
the use of the word "person" in the state's vehicular homicide statute meant a
living individual, and concluded that a seven-month, viable unborn child was
certainly such a person."3 9 The Ohio Court of Appeals, however, in a 2 to 1
decision recently reversed this conviction and released the defendant from all
criminal liability toward the dead child."" The court, citing the Keeler case, held
that the word "person" in the homicide statute was to be given its common law
meaning, and since the unborn child could not be the subject of homicide at
common law, there could be no criminal liability under the present homicide
statute in the absence of express legislative intent.
The primary difficulty with both decisions is that they are illogical to the
extent that a viable, unborn child of seven or eight months is a human being that
is capable of living outside the mother's body, yet such a human being is not
entitled to the law's protection. It seems odd that an unborn child is considered
to be a "person" for the purpose of tort liability if he is killed by a negligent
driver, but is not considered to be a person for purposes of criminal liability. Ohio,
for example, has determined that the unborn child can own and inherit property,
recover in tort for personal injuries and be the subject of a wrongful death action
even if he is born dead, yet Ohio does not extend the protection of the homicide
laws to the unborn child. It again appears that the law rewards the defendant
for killing the unborn child rather than merely injuring him. Unlike the law of
torts, the criminal law of homicide seems to be still adhering to the common law
misconception that the unborn child is part of his mother. Such an attitude does

136 It is not necessary that the injury which causes death be inflicted after the child is born.
If the injuries were inflicted upon the child prior to birth, and the child is born alive but
subsequently dies due to the prior injuries, this is sufficient to establish homicide. Morgan v.
State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923) ; Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1898).
137 Tom C. Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A ConstitutionalAppraisal, 2 LOYOLA
U. L.A. L. REV. 1, 10 (1969).
138 State v. Dickinson. 47 Ohio Op. 2d 373, 248 N.E.2d 458 (1969).
139 Id. at 376, 248 N.E.2d at 461.
140 State v. Dickinson, 23 Ohio App. 2d 259 (1970).
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not speak very highly of twentieth-century criminal justice. As was said in
Bonbrest: "The law is presumed to keep pace with the sciences."" 1 .
III. Abortion, the Law, and the Unborn Child: The Inconsistencies of It All
The law relating to the unborn child was in its final evolutionary stages when
the recent abortion statute revisions struck their revolutionary blows. By the mid1960's, there were few disagreements in this area of the law, but the reversal of
trends by the introduction of the new liberalized abortion statutes has brought
unprecedented inconsistencies to the law. To mention all these inconsistencies
would be a monumental task, but a few examples will be sufficient to present the
problem.
The unborn child, under the law of property in most jurisdictions, can,
among other things, inherit and own an estate," be a tenant-in-common with his
own mother,' and be an actual income recipient prior to birth. 44 The new
liberalized abortion laws, however, present a dilemma in this area. Is it a crime
for a woman to misappropriate the estate of her unborn child, and yet no crime
for her to kill that child? Can a woman, who has inherited an estate as a tenantin-common with her unborn child, increase her own estate 100 percent simply by
killing the child? Will the law which has recognized the unborn child as an actual
income recipient prior to birth allow the child's heir (the mother) to kill the
child for her own financial gain? Will the law that has specifically said that an
unborn child's estate cannot be destroyed where the child has not been represented
before the court4 5 allow the child himself to be destroyed without being represented before the court? These few possibilities are but a sample of the legal maze
that the abortion law revisions have created.
The law of torts provides even more striking examples. Will the pregnant
woman who is hit by a negligent driver while she is on her way to the hospital to
have an abortion still have a cause of action for the wrongful death of her unborn child? If 'so, how is it possible for the law to say that a child can be wrongfully killed only hours before he can be rightfully killed? Absurd as it may seem,
this is the present state of the law in some jurisdictions, and it does no good to say
that the inconsistencies can be abated simply by refusing all recovery for prenatal
injury or death because negligent death or injury to a child whose mother does
not want an abortion clearly is a recognizable wrong for which there must be
just compensation.
Is the unborn child any less a person when, instead of being killed by an
automobile, he is killed by a doctor in the performance of an abortion?' 46 Seldom
has the law been confronted by such an obvious contradiction.
141 See note 55 supra.
142 Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834).
143 Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352 (1882).
144 Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 61 R.I. 169, 200 A. 467 (1938).
145 Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907).
146 In fact, an Ohio court has held that an unborn child in the twenty-fourth week of
gestation is a "person" within the meaning of a family compensation clause of an automobile
liability insurance policy. Peterson v. Nationwide, Mut. Ins. Co., 26 Ohio Op. 2d 246, 197
N.E.2d 194 (1964). Is it possible for a human life to be both legally insuable and legally
destructible at the same moment in time?
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The criminal law also has given rise to legal inconsistencies as a result of the
new abortion laws. The drafters of the Model Penal Code were obviously searching for a criminal law compromise when they included the section on abortion in
the Code.'
The Code attempted to draw a distinction between abortions which
occur late in pregnancy and those which
occur prior to the fourth month of pregnancy, before the fetus becomes
firmly implanted in the womb, before it develops many of the characteristic
and recognizable features of humanity, and well before it is capable of those
movements which when felt by the mother are called "quickening." There
seems to be an obvious difference between terminating the development of
such an inchoate being, whose chance of maturing is still somewhat problematical, and, on the other hand, destroying a fully formed viable fetus of
eight months, where the offense might well become ordinary murder if the
child should happen to survive for a moment after it has been expelled from
the body of the mother. 4
Abortion, even on these terms, would be logically and legally inconsistent. But
some of the states which have recently legalized abortion have gone beyond the
Code's provisions. Eight' 9 of the new liberalized abortion statutes provide no
time limit after which abortions may not be performed. Likewise, abortions at
any moment of pregnancy can now be performed in military hospitals without
regard to local state laws. 5 ° "A fully formed viable fetus of eight months," to
use the Code's language, "where the offense might well become ordinary murder
if the child should happen to survive for a moment after it has been expelled from
the body of the mother," can now be legally killed in the name of abortion. In
effect, as recent reports from Sweden have indicated... these new abortion statutes
have succeeded in legalizing what the criminal law has always regarded as
murder.
Another source of inconsistency for the criminal law is the confrontation
between the feticide statutes that exist in some ten states' 5' and the new abortion
statutes. The feticide statutes make it a separate offense of homicide to kill an
unborn child after quickening by an assault upon the child's mother. These
statutes, therefore, clearly recognize the unborn, quick child as a human being
entitled to the law's protection. How, then, is it possible for the law to say that
a child can be legally killed by abortion when it would be homicide to kill the child
under different circumstances? Some states (other than the ten that still have
feticide statutes) have recognized this inconsistency and, instead of confronting
147 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft,
1962).
148 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 (Tentative Draft No. 9,
1959) (comment).
149 See note 115 supra.
150 Letter from Brigadier General George J. Hayes to Senator Vance Hartke, September 9,
1970, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
151 Generally, after the second or third month of pregnancy the child must be aborted via
a Caesarian section or induced labor. Unlike other methods of abortion where the child is
scraped from the womb of the mother in bits and pieces, see Byrn, Abortion on Demand:
Whose Morality? 46 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 5 (1970), by Caesarian section the child is lifted from
the mother in one piece and then disposed of. Reports from Sweden indicate that some abortions are performed as late as the sixth month. As a result, very often the child will kick and
cry for hours before he finally dies. TIME, Oct. 13, 1967, at 32-33.
152 See note 118 supra.
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abortion for what it really is--a legal absurdity-they have repealed their feticide
statutes, which in some cases had existed for over one hundred years.' 53
No doubt the law could correct these inconsistencies simply by redefining the
terms "homicide" or "human being." If legalized abortion is within the law's
power to grant, then there is no reason why the law cannot just decide who will
live and who will die. Indeed, both modem medicine and the law have agreed
that death is to be defined by the absence of any brain activity as evidenced by a
flat electroencephalogram (EEG)."' The brain of an unborn child has been
found to produce an BEG reading as early as the seventh month of gestation. 5
If life, therefore, is to be evidenced by the presence of an EEG reading, then the
unborn child is legally alive, and to kill him-whether it be called abortion,
therapeutic abortion or eugenic abortion-is murder by the law's very own terms.
Certainly there are due process and equal protection problems if some people
who are "legally" alive are entitled to the law's protection while others are not.
There is no such thing as a constitutional right to kill another human being
as some courts have seemed to suggest.' 6 It might be possible for a court to say
that a woman has a constitutional right to choose whether or not to become
pregnant, as the Supreme Court did in Griswold v. Connecticut,' but for any
court to interpret this to mean that a woman may destroy a life after it has begun is
legal nonsense. The unborn child is not a part of the mother. The organs and the
blood of the child are his own, and at six weeks the features of his face-a human
face-are discernible.'
Even the belief that the placenta was part of the mother
has been proven to be false. 55 The child is "neither a quiescent vegetable nor a
witless tadpole, as some have conceived him to be in the past, but rather a tiny
human being, independent as though he were lying in a crib with a blanket
wrapped around him instead of his mother."' 60 "The fertilized egg ... grows
and develops into an embryo, a fetus, an infant, a youngster, an adolescent, an
adult, an oldster, and, finally a cadaver."'' "Birth is not a beginning.... It is
more nearly a bridge between two stages of life."' 62 It is as irrational to choose
birth, quickening, or viability as the point at which life is to be legally protected
as it is to choose the age of six months, seven years, or the age of adult majority as
the Roman law essentially did.'
Griswold v. Connecticut stands for the principle that there is a constitutional
right to marital privacy. With all due respect for the judges that decided Babbitz
153 E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-409, repealed and superseded by KANSAS LAWS
1969 ch. 180.
154 Biorck, When Is Death? 1968 Wis. L. Ray. 484.
155 GUTTHACHER, The Legal Status of Therapeutic Abortions, in AaoRTIoN iN AmERiCA

177n (Rosen ed. 1967).
156 In Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), the court held that a
woman had a constitutional right to abort a child that had not yet quickened.
157 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
158 H. LuLEY, MODERN MOTHERHOOD 28 (1967).
159 Id. at 24.
160 Id. at 26-27.
161

B. WALLACE AND T. DOLZHANSKY, RADIATION, GENES AND MAN 19-20 (1959), quoted

in Kindregan, Abortion, The Law, and Defective Children: A Legal-Medical Study, 3 SuF.
L. REv. 225, 257 (1969).
162 MONTAGU, LIFE BFoRE BIRTH 205 (1964).
163 J. NOONAN, CONTRACEPTION 113 (1965). Professor Noonan states that it was not made
a crime for a father to kill a son or daughter until November 16, 318 A.D.
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v. McCann,'6 4 abortion has absolutely nothing to do with marital privacy. The
court in Babbitz has made one very big mistake-it has equated the prevention
of life with the destruction of life.
IV. Conclusion
Social and economic pressures are probably the main impetus for the liberalized abortion statutes; surely there is no legal precedent. While social and economic problems should not be disregarded by the law in its decision-making
process, they should not be the sole considerations; they should not be allowed to
blind the law of its true purpose-justice. The laws that a people make for
themselves somehow stand out as a mirror of their social and personal values.
Laws are the personality of a people.
The questions that have been asked in this note and the inconsistencies that
have been enumerated serve to point up the downright absurdity of legalized
abortion in the Anglo-American law. A recent British experience is but an
example:
Early in 1969, an unmarried student was aborted in a Scottish hospital.
The certifying doctors ringed the clauses on the certificate which concern
"greater risk to the mental and physical health of the pregnant woman..."
and "substantial risk of abnormality." In fact the fetus was more than
twenty-eight weeks old and after the abortion lived for nine hours, being
discovered to be alive when the porter carrying-it to an incinerator in a
paper bag heard its cries. 165
Everyone is aware that this is the age of "women's freedom." "But at this
point the evolution favoring freedom for women encounters the evolution favoring
the recognition of the fetus as a living person within the womb-an evolution
supported by the data of biology and the precedents of property, tort, constitutional, and welfare law."'6 8 Upon what basis, therefore, can abortion be legally
justified?
William J. Maledon

164 See note 156 supra.
165 FINNIS, Three Schemes of Regulation, in THE MoRALITY OF ABORTION 213-14 (J.
Noonan ed. 1970). It is interesting to note in this particular case no attempt was made to keep
the child alive, as various medical witnesses later testified, since the object of abortion is to
prevent the child's survival. Id. at 214.
166 Noonan, The Constitutionality of the Regulation of Abortion, 21 HAST. L. J. 51, 65
(1969).

